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We will strive increasingly to quicken the public sense of public duty; that 
thus ... we will transmit this city not only not less, but greater better, and 
more beautiful than it was transmitted to us.
(Oath of office required of council members in the acient city of Athens)       
Abstract
This paper focuses on the role of local governments in bringing about fair, 
accountable, incoorruptible and responsive (FAIR) governance. Local governments 
around the world have done important innovations to earn the trust of their residents 
and their comparative performance is of great interest yet a comprehensive framework 
to provide such benchmarking is not available. This paper attempts to fill this void, by 
developing a general framework for performance accountability of local governments 
and by relating real world practices to aspects of this framework. The proposed rating 
framework requires several types of assessments: (a) their compliance with due 
process and law; (b) monitoring of fiscal health for sustainability; (c) monitoring of 
service delivery ; and (d) citizens’ satisfaction with local services. The approach yields 
key indicators useful for benchmarking performance that can be used in self-
evaluation and improvement of performance. t From an analysis of practices in local 
government performance monitoring and evaluation, the paper concludes that ad hoc 
ad-on self standing monitoring and evaluation systems are more costly and less useful 
than built-in tools and mechanisms for government transparency, self–evaluation and 
citizen based accountability such as local government output budgeting and output 
based fiscal transfers to finance local services.
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1. Introduction
Democratization through political decentralization spread like wildfire in developing 
and transition economies in the 1990s yet fruits of this democratic participation 
remain largely elusive. What went wrong? This paper argues that these disappointing 
results may be attributable to a lack of progress in citizen empowerment to hold 
governments accountable in between elections as a median voter lacks the skills 
to evaluate government performance and hold it to account. It is in the interest of 
political and bureaucratic elites to ensure that the status quo prevails and the sun 
does not shine on government operations. Unraveling of this system requires 
fundamental institutional and legal reforms to empower citizens to demand 
accountability for performance from their governments. This paper focuses on local 
governance especially the role of local governments to bring about this change. Local 
governments around the world have done important innovations to strengthen local 
accountability to earn the trust of their residents. The practice in this area, however, 
has leapfrogged the conceptual perspectives. This paper attempts to fill this void by 
developing a general framework for performance accountability of local governments 
and by relating real world practices to aspects of this framework. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. A discussion of the evolving roles 
of local government is taken up first as a section 2. This section is followed by 
a conceptual framework on local government accountability and thoughts on its 
implementation methods and processes in the section 3. The following sections 4 
highlight better practices in local government performance accountability. Section 5 
highlights examples of not so good practices. A concluding section 6 draws general 
lessons from these experiences. 
2. Literature review
Globalization and the information revolution has catapulted into prominence the 
role of local government in improving economic and social outcomes of its resident 
members. As a result, countries around the world are contemplating a more expansive 
role of local governments in multi-order governance. To be effective, the enhanced 
role of local government in local governance, however, need to accompanied 
by greater accountability of these entities to local residents. This requires an 
understanding of the conceptual as well as empirical perspectives on the role of local 
governments. The following sections provide a discussion of these issues. 
2.1. Conceptual underpinnings of the role of local governments
There are five perspectives on models of government and the roles and responsibilities 
of local government: (a) traditional fiscal federalism, (b) new public management 
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(NPM), (c) public choice, (d) new institutional economics (NIE), and (e) network 
forms of local governance. The federalism and the NPM perspectives are concerned 
primarily with market failures and how to deliver public goods efficiently and 
equitably. The public choice and NIE perspectives are concerned with government 
failures. The network forms of governance perspective is concerned with institutional 
arrangements to overcome both market and government failures.
Local government as a hand maiden of a higher government order:  
Traditional  fiscal federalism perspectives
The fiscal federalism approach treats local government as a subordinate tier 
in a multi-tiered system and outlines principles for defining the roles and 
responsibilities of orders of government (see Boadway and Shah, 2009) for such 
a framework for the design of fiscal constitutions). Hence, one sees that in most 
federations, as in Canada and the United States, local governments are creatures 
or extensions of state/provincial governments (dual federalism). In a few isolated 
instances, as in Brazil, they are equal partners with higher-level governments 
(cooperative federalism), and in an exceptional case, Switzerland, they are the main 
source of sovereignty and have greater constitutional significance than the federal 
government. Thus with the sole exception of Switzerland, under federalism, local 
government role in multi-order governance, is highly constrained and depending 
on the constitutional and legal status of local governments, state governments in 
federal countries assume varying degrees of oversight of the provision of local 
public services. 
The fiscal federalism perspectives have resulted in some major difficulties 
in practice–especially in developing countries–because the practice seems to 
emphasize fiscal federalism’s structures and processes as the end rather than as 
the means to an end thereby creating a governance system that is devoid of public 
interest or citizens’ control and characterized by “governments by the government, 
for the government and of the government” (Shah, 2014, 2010a, 2010b). These 
structures and processes were designed as a response to market failures and 
heterogeneous preferences with little recognition of government failures or the role 
of entities beyond government. The NPM and the NIE literature (synthesized in the 
following paragraphs) sheds further light on the origins of these difficulties. This 
literature highlights the sources of government failures and their implications for 
the role of local government. 
Local government as an independent facilitator of creating public value:  
New public management perspectives 
Two interrelated criteria have emerged from the NPM literature in recent years 
determining, first, what local governments should do and, second, how they 
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should do it better. In discussing the first criterion, the literature assumes that 
citizens are the principals but have multiple roles as governors (owner-authorizers, 
voters, taxpayers, community members); activist-producers (providers of services, 
co-producers, self-helpers obliging others to act); and consumers (clients and 
beneficiaries). In this context, significant emphasis is placed on the government 
as an agent of the people to serve public interest and create public value. Moore 
(1996) defines public value as measurable improvements in social outcomes or 
quality of life. Moore (1996) has argued that, rather than diverting resources from 
the private sector, local governments use some of the resources that come as free 
goods–namely, resources of consent, goodwill, good Samaritan values, community 
spirit, compliance, and collective public action. This argument suggests that the role 
of public managers in local governments is to tap these free resources and push the 
frontiers of improved social outcomes beyond what may be possible with meager 
local revenues. Thus, public managers create value by mobilizing and facilitating 
a network of providers beyond local government. Democratic accountability 
ensures that managerial choices about creating public value are based on broader 
consensus by local residents (see Goss, 2001). Thus, the local public sector 
continuously strives to respect citizen preferences and to be accountable to them. 
This environment, focused on creating public value, encourages innovation 
and experimentation, bounded by the risk tolerance of the median voter in each 
community. The main current of the NPM literature is concerned with the second 
criterion mentioned earlier i.e. not with what to do but with how to do it better. 
It argues for an incentive environment in which managers are given flexibility in 
the use of resources but held accountable for results. Top-down controls are thus 
replaced by a bottom-up focus on results. 
Local government as an institution to advance self-interest:  
The public choice approach
The public choice literature endorses the self-interest doctrine of government and 
argues that various stakeholders involved in policy formulation and implementation 
are expected to use opportunities and resources to advance their self-interest. This 
view has important implications for the design of local government institutions. For 
local governments to serve the interests of people, they must have complete local 
autonomy in taxing and spending and they must be subject to competition within 
and beyond government. In the absence of these prerequisites, local governments 
will be inefficient and unresponsive to citizen preferences (Boyne, 1998). Bailey 
(1999) advocates strengthening exit and voice mechanisms in local governance 
to overcome government failures associated with the self-interest doctrine of 
public choice. He suggests that easing supply-side constraints for public services 
through wider competition will enhance choice and promote exit options and that 
direct democracy provisions will strengthen voice (see also Dollery and Wallis, 
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2001, Dollery and Robotti, 200). The NIE approach discussed below draws on the 
implications of opportunistic behavior by government agents for the transaction 
costs to citizens as principals. 
The government as a runaway train: NIE concerns with the institutions  
of public governance
The NIE provides a framework for analyzing fiscal systems and local empowerment 
and for comparing mechanisms for local governance. This framework is helpful 
in designing multiple orders of government and in clarifying local government 
responsibilities in a broader framework of local governance. According to the NIE 
framework, various orders of governments (as agents) are created to serve the 
interests of the citizens as principals. The jurisdictional design should ensure that 
these agents serve the public interest while minimizing transaction costs for the 
principals. 
The existing institutional framework does not permit such optimization, because 
the principals have bounded rationality; that is, they make the best choices on the 
basis of the information at hand but are ill informed about government operations. 
Enlarging the sphere of their knowledge entails high transaction costs, which 
citizens are not willing to incur. Those costs include participation and monitoring 
costs, legislative costs, executive decision-making costs, agency costs or costs 
incurred to induce compliance by agents with the compact, and uncertainty costs 
associated with unstable political regimes (Horn, 1997; Shah, 2005). Agents 
(various orders of governments) are better informed about government operations 
than principals are, but they have an incentive to withhold information and to 
indulge in opportunistic behaviors or “self-interest seeking with guile” (Williamson, 
1985: 7). Thus, the principals have only incomplete contracts with their agents. 
Such an environment fosters commitment problems because the agents may not 
follow the compact. 
The situation is further complicated by three factors–weak or extant countervailing 
institutions, path dependency, and the interdependency of various actions. 
Countervailing institutions such as the judiciary, police, parliament, and citizen 
activist groups are usually weak and unable to restrain rent-seeking by politicians 
and bureaucrats. Historical and cultural factors and mental models by which people 
see little benefits to and high costs of activism prevent corrective action. Further 
empowering of local councils to take action on behalf of citizens often leads to loss 
of agency between voters and councils, because council members may interfere in 
executive decision making or may get co-opted in such operations while shirking 
their legislative responsibilities. The NIE framework stresses the need to use 
various elements of transaction costs in designing jurisdictions for various services 
and in evaluating choices between competing governance mechanisms.
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Local government as a facilitator of network forms of local governance
Given the high transaction costs and perceived infeasibility of market and 
hierarchical mechanisms of governance for partnerships of multiple organizations, 
a network mechanism of governance has been advanced as a possible mode of 
governance for such partnerships–the kind to be managed by local governments. 
The network form of governance relies on trust, loyalty, and reciprocity between 
partners with no formal institutional safeguards. Networks formed on the 
basis of shared interests (interest-based networks) can provide a stable form 
of governance if membership is limited to partners that can make significant 
resource contributions and if there is a balance of powers among members. 
Members of such networks interact frequently and see cooperation in one area as 
contingent on cooperation in other areas. Repeated interaction among members 
builds trust. Hope-based networks are built on the shared sentiments and emotions 
of members. Members have shared beliefs in the worth and philosophy of the 
network goals and have the passion and commitment to achieve those goals. The 
stability of such networks is highly dependent on the commitment and style of 
their leadership (Dollery and Wallis, 2001) and the catalytic and mediating role 
played by local governments. 
Summing up the conceptual role of local governments it can be said that we have 
presented a brief overview of the conceptual and institutional literature on local 
governance. A synthesis of the conceptual literature suggests that the modern role 
of a local government is to deal with market failures as well as government failures. 
This role requires a local government to operate as a purchaser of local services, a 
facilitator of networks of government providers and entities beyond government, 
and a gatekeeper and overseer of state and national governments in areas of shared 
rule. Local government also needs to play a mediator’s role among various entities 
and networks to foster greater synergy and harness the untapped energies of the 
broader community for improving the quality of life of residents. Globalization 
and the information revolution are reinforcing those conceptual perspectives on 
a catalytic role for local governments (see Shah and Shah, 2007, Shah (2006a, 
2006b)). 
This view is also grounded in the history of industrial nations and ancient 
civilizations in China and India. Local government was the primary form of 
government until wars and conquest led to the transfer of local government 
responsibilities to central and regional governments. This trend continued 
unabated until globalization and the information revolution highlighted the 
weaknesses of centralized rule for improving the quality of life and social 
outcomes. The new vision of local governance presented here argues for a 
leadership role by local governments in a multi-centered, multi-order, or multi-
level system (See Table 1).
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This view is critical to creating and sustaining citizen-centered governance, in 
which citizens are the ultimate sovereigns and various orders of governments serve 
as agents in the supply of public governance. In developing countries, such citizen 
empowerment may be the only way to reform public sector governance when 
governments are either unwilling or unable to reform themselves. 
Table 1: Evolving role of local governments in the 21st century 
Old view: 20th century New view: 21st century
Is based on residuality and local 
governments as wards of the state
Is based on subsidiarity and home rule
Is based on principle of ultra vires Is based on community governance
Is focused on government Is focused on citizen-centered local governance
Is agent of the central government Is the primary agent for the citizens and leader and 
gatekeeper for shared rule
Is responsive and accountable to 
higher-level governments
Is responsive and accountable to local voters; assumes 
leadership role in improving local governance 
Is direct provider of local services Is purchaser of local services
Is focused on in-house provision Is facilitator of network mechanisms of local governance, 
coordinator of government providers and entities beyond 
government, mediator of conflicts, and developer of social 
capital
Is focused on secrecy Is focused on letting the sunshine in; practices transparent 
governance 
Has input controls Recognizes that results matter
Is internally dependent Is externally focused and competitive; is ardent practitioner 
of alternative service delivery framework
Is closed and slow Is open, quick, and flexible
Has intolerance for risk Is innovative; is risk taker within limits
Depends on central directives Is autonomous in taxing, spending, regulatory, and 
administrative decisions
Is rules driven Has managerial flexibility and accountability for results
Is bureaucratic and technocratic Is participatory; works to strengthen citizen voice and exit 
options through direct democracy provisions, citizens’ 
charters, and performance budgeting
Is coercive Is focused on earning trust, creating space for civic dialogue, 
serving the citizens, and improving social outcomes
Is fiscally irresponsible Is fiscally prudent; works better and costs less
Is exclusive with elite capture Is inclusive and participatory
Overcomes market failures Overcomes market and government failures
Is boxed in a centralized system Is connected in a globalized and localized world
Source: Shah (2006a, 2006b)
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2.2. The practice of local governance in the 21st century
Local governance historically predates the emergence of nation-states. In ancient 
history, tribes and clans established systems of local governance in most of the 
world. They established their own codes of conduct and ways of raising revenues 
and delivering services to the tribe or the clan. The tribal and clan elders developed 
consensus on the roles and responsibilities of various members. Some tribes 
and clans with better organization and skills then sought to enlarge their spheres 
of influence through conquest and cooperation with other tribes. In this way, the 
first Chinese dynasty, the Xia, was established (2070 BC to 1600 BC) (see Zheng 
and Fan, 2003). A similar situation prevailed in ancient India, where in the third 
millennium BC (about 2500 BC) a rich civilization was established in the Indus 
Valley (now Pakistan). This advanced civilization placed great emphasis on 
autonomy in local governance and enshrined a consensus on division of work for 
various members of the society. This emphasis led to the creation of a class society 
in which each member had a defined role: upholder of moral values, soldier, farmer, 
tradesperson, worker. Each community formed its own consensus on community 
services and how to accomplish them.
Native American tribes in North America and tribes and clans in Western Europe 
also enjoyed home rule. Subsequent conquests and wars led to the demise of these 
harmonious systems of self-rule in local governance and to the emergence of rule 
by central governments all over the world. This development (roughly around 1000 
BC in Western Europe) ultimately led to the creation of unique systems of local 
governance and central-local relations in most countries. 
Historical evolution and the current practice of local governance is instructive in 
drawing lessons for reform of local governance, especially in developing countries. 
There is great diversity in practice in local governance in industrial countries, 
but there are also some common strands. The diversity is in the institutional 
arrangements, which have evolved incrementally over a long period. This evolution 
has resulted in diverse roles for local governments and diverse relations with central 
governments across countries. In Nordic countries, local government serves as the 
primary agent of the people, whereas in Australia, that role is entrusted to state 
governments, and local government has a minimal role in local affairs. 
There is no uniform model for local government size, structure, tiers, and functions 
across OECD countries. There are nevertheless a number of interesting common 
features. First, most countries recognize that finance must follow function to 
ensure that local governments are able to meet their responsibilities efficiently and 
equitably. Second, home rule is considered critical to meeting local expectations 
and being responsive to local residents. Therefore, local governments must have 
significant taxing, spending, and regulatory autonomy, and they must have the 
ability to hire, fire, and set terms of reference for employees without having to 
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defer to higher levels of governments. Only then can local governments innovate 
in management by introducing performance-based accountability and innovate 
in service delivery by forging alternative service delivery arrangements through 
competitive provision, contracting, and outsourcing wherever deemed appropriate. 
They can also facilitate a broader network of local governance and harness the 
energies of the whole community to foster better social outcomes. Third and 
most important, accountability to local residents has been the factor most critical 
to the success of local governance in industrial countries. This accountability is 
strengthened through democratic choice, participation, transparency, performance 
budgeting, citizens’ charters of rights, and various legal and financing provisions 
that support wider voice, choice, and exit options to residents. 
Recent years have also seen positive developments regarding local governance in 
developing countries. Local governments are increasingly assuming a larger role 
in public services delivery. However, with the exception of a handful of countries 
such as Brazil, China, and Poland, local governments continue to play a very small 
role in people’s lives. They typically are bounded by the principle of ultra vires 
and allowed to discharge only a small number of functions, which are mandated 
from above. They have limited autonomy in expenditure decisions and hardly any 
in revenue-raising decisions. Their access to own-source revenues is constrained 
to a few nonproductive bases. Political and bureaucratic leaders at the local level 
show little interest in lobbying for more taxing powers and instead devote all their 
energies to seeking higher levels of fiscal transfers. 
As a result, tax decentralization has not kept pace with political and expenditure 
decentralization. Hence, one does not find many examples of tax-base sharing, 
and even the limited existing bases available to local governments are typically 
underexploited. Fiscal transfers typically account for 60 percent of revenues in 
developing countries (51 percent in sample developing countries) as opposed to 
only 34 percent in OECD countries. This distinct separation of taxing and spending 
decisions undermines accountability to local citizens because local leaders do not 
have to justify local spending decisions to their electorates. 
Local self-financing is important for strengthening governance, efficiency, and 
accountability. Although most countries have opted for formula-driven fiscal 
transfers, the design of these transfers remains flawed. They do not create any 
incentive for setting national minimum standards or accountability for results and 
typically do not serve regional fiscal equity objectives either. 
Local governments also typically have very limited autonomy in hiring and firing 
local government employees. In a number of countries with decentralization, such 
as Indonesia and Pakistan, higher government employees are simply transferred to 
local levels; financing is then provided to cover their wage costs. This approach limits 
budgetary flexibility and opportunities for efficient resource allocation at the local 
level. 
Anwar Shah • Responsibility with accountability: a FAIR governance framework... 
352 Zb. rad. Ekon. fak. Rij. • 2014 • vol. 32 • sv. 2 • 343-377
Overall, local governments in developing countries typically follow the old model 
of local governance and simply provide directly a narrow range of local services. 
The new vision, with the local governments assuming a network facilitator role to 
enrich the quality of life of local residents, as discussed earlier in this paper, is yet 
to be realized in any developing country.
Summing up the evolving role of local governments we have reviewed ideas 
emerging from the literature on political science, economics, public administration, 
law, federalism, and the NIE with a view to developing an integrated analytical 
framework for the comparative analysis of local government and local governance 
institutions. 
The dominant concern in this literature is that the incentives and accountability 
framework faced by various orders of government is not conducive to a focus on 
service delivery consistent with citizen preferences. As a result, corruption, waste, 
and inefficiencies permeate public governance. Top-down hierarchical controls are 
ineffective; there is little accountability because citizens are not empowered to hold 
governments accountable. 
Fiscal federalism practices around the world are focused on structures and 
processes, with little regard for outputs and outcomes. These practices support 
top-down structures with preeminent federal legislation (that is, federal legislation 
overrides any subnational legislation). The central government is at the apex, 
exercising direct control and micromanaging the system. Hierarchical controls 
exercised by various layers of government have an internal rule-based focus with 
little concern for their mandates. Government competencies are determined on 
the basis of technical and administrative capacity, with almost no regard for client 
orientation, bottom-up accountability, and lowering of transaction costs for citizens. 
Various orders of government indulge in uncooperative zero-sum games for control. 
This tug of war leads to large swings in the balance of powers. Shared rule is a 
source of much confusion and conflict, especially in federal systems. Local 
governments are typically handmaidens of states or provinces and given straitjacket 
mandates. They are given only limited home rule in their competencies. In short, 
local governments in this system of “federalism for the governments, by the 
governments, and of the governments” get crushed under a regime of intrusive 
controls by higher levels of governments. Citizens also have limited voice and exit 
options. 
The governance implications of such a system are quite obvious. Various orders 
of government suffer from agency problems associated with incomplete contracts 
and undefined property rights, as the assignment of taxing, spending, and regulatory 
powers remains to be clarified–especially in areas of shared rule. Intergovernmental 
bargaining leads to high transaction costs for citizens. Universalism and pork-barrel 
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politics result in a tragedy of commons, as various orders of government compete to 
claim a higher share of common pool resources. Under this system of governance, 
citizens are treated as agents rather than as principals. 
On how to reverse this trend and make governments responsive and accountable 
to citizens, the dominant themes emphasized in the literature are the subsidiarity 
principle, the principle of fiscal equivalency, the creation of public value, results-
based accountability, and the minimization of transaction costs for citizens, as 
discussed earlier. These themes are useful but should be integrated into a broader 
framework of citizen-centered governance, to create an incentive environment in 
the public sector that is compatible with a public sector focus on service delivery 
and bottom-up accountability. Such integration is expected to deal with the 
commitment problem in various levels of government by empowering citizens and 
by limiting their agents’ ability to indulge in opportunistic behavior. The following 
section attempts to develop a rating framework for oversight and accountability of 
local governments to create incentives for FAIR (fair, accountable, incorruptible 
and responsive) local governance. 
3. Responsibility with accountability: a FAIR governance 
framework for performance accountability of local governments
The rating framework proposed below attempts to reinforce desired role of the local 
government for the 21st century. In view of this the rating framework would serve 
as a useful reference for rating the institutional framework for local governance for 
a country as well as rating individual local governments. Thus the framework is 
intended not just to guide the performance improvements that a local government 
may be able to undertake itself but also to facilitate reforms that empower local 
governments to play their due role to improve economic and social outcomes for 
local residents.
A FAIR governance framework lays down the following four principles for local 
government accountability.
Fair Governance. Fair governance requires that the local government equal and fair 
access to essential public services with equitable sharing of local tax burdens. It 
also acts as an equal opportunity employer. For peace, order and good government, 
the local government mediates conflicting interests, is focused on consensus 
building and inclusiveness and ensures a sense of participation by all and protection 
of the poor, the minorities and the disadvantaged members of the society.
Accountable governance. Accountable governance requires that citizens may be 
able to hold the government to account for all its actions while incurring minimum 
transactions costs. This requires that the local government lets sunshine in on its 
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operations and works to strengthen voice and exit options for principals. It also 
means that the government truly respects the role of countervailing formal and 
informal institutions of accountability in governance. A local government should 
be accountable to its electorate. It should adhere to appropriate safeguards to ensure 
that it serves the public interest with integrity. Legal and institutional reforms 
may be needed to enable local governments to deal with accountability between 
elections–reforms such as a citizen’s charter and a provision for recall of public 
officials. 
Incorruptible governance. Incorruptible governance requires that the local 
government does it right i.e. governmental authority is carried out following due 
process with integrity (absence of corruption), with fiscal prudence, with concern 
for providing the best value for money and with a view to earning trust of the 
people. The government should also do it right–that is, manage its fiscal resources 
prudently. It should earn the trust of residents by working better and costing less 
and by managing fiscal and social risks for the community. It should strive to 
improve the quality and quantity of and access to public services. To do so, it needs 
to benchmark its performance with the best-performing local government. 
Responsive governance. The fundamental task of governing is to promote and 
pursue collective interest while respecting formal (rule of law) and informal 
norms. This is done by local government creating an enabling environment to do 
the right things – that is, it promotes and delivers services consistent with citizen 
preferences. Further, the government carries out only the tasks that it is authorized 
to do, that is, it follows the compact authorized by citizens at large. 
A rating framework based upon the above principles is embodied in Table 2. 
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Table 2: A FAIR governance framework for rating performance accountability of 
local governments 
Fair Governance Accountable governance Incorruptible governance Responsive Governance
Is inclusive
• Protects the 
poor and the 
disadvantaged 
members of the 
society
• Equal and 







sharing of local 
tax burdens
Lets the sunshine in: 
• Local government 
bylaw on citizens’ 
right to know
• Budgetary proposals 
and annual 
performance reports 
posted on the Internet
• All decisions, 
including the costs of 
concessions, posted 
on the Internet
• Value for money 
performance audits 
by independent think 
tanks
• Open information and 
public assessment
Works to strengthen 
citizen voice and exit:
• Citizens’ charter
• Service standards
• Requirements for 
citizens’ voice and 
choice
• Sunshine rights
• Sunset clauses on 
government programs
Follows due process:
• The principle of 
ultra vires or general 
competence or 
community governance
• The procedure bylaw
• Local master plans and 
budgets




• Operating budget in 
balance
• Golden rule for borrowing
• New capital projects that 
specify upkeep costs and 
how debt is to be repaid
• Conservative fiscal rules 
to ensure sustainable debt 
levels
• Major capital projects that 
are subject to referenda
• Maintenance of positive 
net worth 
• Commercially audited 
financial statements
Earns trust:
• Professionalism and 
integrity of staff
• Safeguards against 
malfeasance
• Streamlined processes 
and e-governance
• Complaints and feedback 
acted on
• Honest and fair tax 
administration
• Strict compliance with 
service standards
• Citizen-friendly output 
budgets and service 
delivery performance 
reports
• Participatory budgeting 
and planning
Is citizen focused and 
customer driven
• By law on taxpayer 
rights
• Has subsidiarity and 
home rule
• Has direct democracy 
provisions
• Has budget priorities 
consistent with 
citizens’ preferences
• Specifies and meets 
standards for access 
to local services
• Improves social 
outcomes
• Offers security of life 
and property
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Fair Governance Accountable governance Incorruptible governance Responsive Governance







• Service delivery 
outputs and costs
• Citizens’ report card 
on service delivery 
performance
• Budget, contracts, 
and performance 
reports defended 
at open town hall 
meetings
• All documents 
subjected to citizen-
friendly requirements
• Open processes for 
contract bids
• Mandatory referenda 
on large projects
• Steps taken so that 
at least 50 percent of 
eligible voters vote
• Citizens’ boards to 
provide scorecard and 
feedback on service 
delivery performance
• Provisions for 
popular initiatives 
and recall of public 
officials
Works better and costs less:
• All tasks subjected 
to alternative service 
delivery test–that is, 
competitive provision 
involving government 
providers and entities 
beyond government 
• Financing that creates 
incentives for competition 
and innovation
• Comparative evaluation 
of service providers
• Public sector as a 
purchaser through 
performance contracts but 
not necessarily a provider 
of services
• Managerial flexibility, but 
accountability for results
• No lifelong or rotating 
appointments
• Task specialization 
• Budgetary allocation and 
output-based performance 
contracts 
• Activity-based costing 
• Charges for capital use
• Accrual accounting 
• Benchmarking with the 
best
• General administration 
costs subjected to public 
scrutiny
• Boundaries that balance 
benefits and costs of scale 
and scope economies, 
externalities, and decision 
making
• Boundaries consistent 
with fiscal sustainability
• Offers shelter and 
food for all
• Has clean air, safe 
water, and sanitation
• Has a noise-free 
and preserved 
environment
• Offers ease of 
commute and 
pothole-free roads
• Has primary school at 
a walking distance
• Has acceptable fire 
and ambulance 
response times
• Has libraries and 
Internet access




The table outlines specific criteria on which local governments can be rated for 
performance. Overall, the rating framework accentuates local government focus 
on citizen-centered governance. The distinguishing features of citizen-centered 
governance are:
(continuation)
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 – Citizen empowerment through a rights-based approach (direct democracy 
provisions, citizens’ charter)
 – Bottom-up accountability for results
 – Evaluation of government performance as the facilitator of a network of 
providers by citizens as governors, taxpayers, and consumers of public services. 
The framework emphasizes principles that strengthen the role of citizens as the 
principals and create incentives for government agents to comply with their 
mandates. The commitment problem may be mitigated by creating citizen-centered 
local governance–by having direct democracy provisions, introducing governing 
for results in government operations, and reforming the structure of governance, 
thus shifting decision making closer to the people. Direct democracy provisions 
require referenda on major issues and large projects and require that citizens have 
the right to veto any legislation or government program. The FAIR governance 
framework requires government accountability to citizens for service delivery 
performance ( see Ivanyna and Shah, 2014, 2011a, 2011b for application of FAIR 
Governnace framework for country rankings on good governance). Hence, citizens 
have a charter defining their basic rights as well as their rights of access to specific 
standards of public services. Output-based intergovernmental transfers strengthen 
compliance with such standards and strengthen accountability and citizen 
empowerment (Shah, 2010c, 2010d).
The local government accountability framework described above has important 
implications for reforming the structure of government. Top-down mandates on 
local governance will need to be replaced by bottom-up compacts. Furthermore, 
the role of local government must be expanded to serve as a catalyst for the 
formulation, development, and operation of a network of both government 
providers and entities beyond government. Local government’s traditionally 
acknowledged technical capacity becomes less relevant in this framework. More 
important are its institutional strengths as a purchaser of services and as a facilitator 
of alliances, partnerships, associations, clubs, and networks for developing social 
capital and improving social outcomes. 
Table 2 provides a comprehensive rating framework to evaluate local governments 
on the four aspects of FAIR governance. This evaluation would require both 
inspections and audits for conformity with the law and reporting and requirements 
on fiscal and financial management and service delivery performance of local 
governments. It will also require citizens’ opinion surveys conducted by 
independent research, think-tanks or non-governmental organizations to assess 
citizens’ evaluations of local government services. These issues are taken up in the 
next section.
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4. Implementation of the FAIR governance performance 
accountability framework: process, methods and practices
4.1. Process and methods of the implementation
Local government monitoring and oversight requires (a) verifying their conformity 
with law in following due processes and (b) ensuring that they follow prudent and 
transparent fiscal and financial management practices and (c) deliver services in the 
most cost effective manner. The former two criteria require voluntary compliance 
and verification through occasional inspections and audits. Most of the criteria 
presented in Table 2 relates to the first two concerns. Several criteria nevertheless 
require formal periodic reporting requirements. Higher level government should 
provide legislative backing for such reporting. All local governments should be 
required on a quarterly basis to submit reports on their revenues and expenditures. 
They may also be required to submit annual commercially audited financial balance 
sheet detailing the previous year revenues and expenditures – both operating and 
capital, and assets and liabilities within three months after the end of the fiscal 
year. This should also be accompanied by annual report detailing service delivery 
performance using a standard format prescribed for all local governments of the 
same type and size class. Table 3 provides a format for reporting service delivery 
performance. 
Table 3: Key service delivery performance indicators for local governments
No. Function Key Performance Indicators
0. General administration Total full time equivalent employees
Total costs (wages, benefits, pension etc)




walkways and footpaths (KM) 
Total roads in KM resurfaced each year
Physical conditions (rate each): % good, fair or poor condition:
2. Public Electricity No. of connections
Average No. of hours of uninterrupted service per month.
No. of billing complaints 
3. Drainage Length of total wastewater main
Length of storm water system
Physical condition of drainage infrastructure: % good, fair or poor
% of network not completed – wastewater and storm water
No. of business and households served 
No. of Incidents of wastewater main backups 
4. Water Supply Total length of water main
Physical condition of water infrastructure: %good, fair or poor
Percent of homes with access to safe drinking water 24/7
No. of Water main breakup incidents 
No. of contamination incidents
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No. Function Key Performance Indicators
5. Child and Youth 
Development
Number of children and youth participating in LG sponsored 
events
6. Sports Promotion Number participating in local government sponsored classes or 
events
No. of playgrounds maintained to fair or good condition
Square meters of outdoor sports and recreation local government 
owned facility space per thousand person
7. Promotion of Elderly No. of elderly provided with home care (general or nursing visits)
8. Supporting 
Disadvantaged Groups
Total number of disadvantaged clients served
9. Public Health Total no. of clinics
Number of visitors
Number of vaccinations
Number of clinics staffed with a qualified GP
Number of clinics staffed with a nurse
Number with adequate medicines
10. Promotion of Women Total number of women participating in locally sponsored 
programs
11. Promotion of Careers Hours of training/skill building offered
Total participants
12. Disaster Prevention and 
Mitigation
Description of work performed
13. Promotion of Religion, 
Arts, and Culture
Total number of participants in local government sponsored events
14. Promotion of Tourism Total number of tourists
Total revenue from tourism
15. Management of Natural 
Resources
Description of work 




Achievement scores on standardized tests
Source: Author′s views
This format can be amended to include additional services performed by local 
governments or to exclude services listed here but not performed. It is important to 
publish on the web annually both the financial balance sheet as well as the service 
delivery performance of local governments so that independent researchers and 
citizens can vouch for the authenticity of the data being reported as well as develop 
benchmarking analysis. The Council of Australian Government specifies a useful 
set of considerations in deciding upon the performance indicators to be used. (see 
Table 4). 
(continuation)
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Source: Australia, Government of (2014). Productivity Commission, Annual Report on Govern- 
 ment Services, 2014, Box 1.4, pp. 1.11-1.12
Benchmarking analysis is also a tool frequently used by local governments for 
self-evaluation and improvement of their performance (see Table 5 for a listing of 
principal tools for results oriented management). 
Table 5: Tools for results oriented management – external, citizen focus 
Question for results-oriented management Management tool The entire process driven by a citizen focus
Contract information – what is the final 
product we must produce and what do we 
receive to produce such a product
Performance-
based budget
All these tools are connected to 
Total Quality Management and 
such devices used to create a 
results and participation culture, 
and work effectively where roles 
emphasize results.
How do we know how we are doing in 
terms of the contract, and in terms of other 
producers from whom we can learn?
Benchmarking
How much does it cost to produce such a 
product (the complete cost)? How can we 
produce the product better so we can be 
sure of meeting and exceeding our contract 








How do we manage the new reporting, 
production, and contract obligations we 
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Through benchmarking local governments can have specific goals to judge their 
performance against itself as well as against comparators at a point in time and 
overtime. The indicators frequently used for this purpose, with examples for police 
protection and roadways, are:
 – The cost of various public services e.g. per capita expenditures;
 – The Workload of public services e.g. average number of police calls, lane miles 
to be constructed and maintained;
 – The efficiency of public services e.g. average cost per incident, annual 
maintenance cost per lane mile;
 – The Equity of public service provision e.g. crime prevention in poor 
neighborhoods, access to public transit by the poor and the needy;
 – The quality and quantity of public services e.g. percent of cases cleared, percent 
of lane miles in good repair; and 
 – The Quality of life in the municipality e.g. incident of violent crimes per 1000 
people, citizens’ satisfaction with services. 
The above information can be highly useful to policy makers in improving 
performance and to citizens for performance accountability of their local 
governments. 
4.2. Practices in local government performance accountability
Local governments in industrial countries are subject to stringent higher level 
regulations and fiscal rules to ensure fiscal discipline and fiscal sustainability. These 
typically include compliance with the laws and reporting requirements for financial 
flows, assets and liabilities. Occasionally, as done by Ontario, Canada, higher level 
governments impose reporting requirements for service delivery performance. 
Beyond this, local governments do more in fiscal and operations transparency 
to strive to earn the trust of their local residents. In the following paragraphs we 
highlight useful examples from a select group of countries.
Mandatory higher level oversight of local government fiscal health
This is typically done through the requirements of submission of commercially 
audited financial statements on a quarterly or on an annual basis. These statements 
are used to develop an early warning system of fiscal stress. For example, in Russia 
an oblast or a rayon is rated as “in fiscal distress” if its debt to revenue ratio exceeds 
30% and 15% respectively. Debt services to revenue ratio exceeding specified 
limits is seen in Italy and Spain (25%), Japan (20%) and Russia (15%) indicating 
fiscal stress. Colombia has developed a traffic light system to rate local government 
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fiscal health (see Crivelli and Shah, 2009). A local government is considered in 
good fiscal health (green light) if its interest payments to revenue surplus (excess of 
revenues over mandatory expenditures) ratio is less than 40% and its debt to current 
income is less than 80%. It is considered in fiscal distress (red light) and subject to 
central oversight if its ratio of interest payments to revenue surplus exceeds 60% 
and its ratio of debt to current income exceeds 80%. A ratio of interest payments 
to revenue surplus in the range of 40-60% qualifies for a close surveillance status 
(yellow light). The State of Michigan, USA has developed a 10-point fiscal stress 
indicator for local governments. These points include: population growth (2 years), 
real taxable value growth (2 years) large decreases in real taxable value, general 
fund expenditures as percent of taxable value, general fund operating deficit, prior 
general fund operating deficits, general fund finances as a percentage of general 
fund revenues, current and previous year deficit in a major fund, general long term 
debt as a percent of real taxable value. The State of Ohio, USA has a fiscal watch 
program for its local governments. A local government is placed under fiscal watch 
if deficit exceeds 8.3% of revenues and the state auditor suggests a workout. A 
local government is placed under fiscal emergency if it incurs more than 30 day 
default on debt obligations and/or payment of salaries or deficit or overdue amounts 
payable exceed one-sixth of the previous year revenues. Such a local government 
is then placed under a state appointed control board or planning and supervisory 
commission. 
Mandatory local government service delivery performance reporting 
requirements
The Province of Ontario, Canada initiated Municipal Performance Measurement 
Program (MPMP) in 2000. This was followed in 2000 by the Provinces of Nova 
Scotia Municipal Indicators Program (MIP) and the Province of Quebec in 2003 
initiating Municipal Performance Measurement System (MPMS). The Ontario 
program is concerned with measuring the cost efficiency and effectiveness of 
municipal services and benchmarking inter-local performance in the delivery 
of services. For each service a minimum set of standardized indicators have 
been developed (see Annex Table A1). This contrasts with an exhaustive set of 
indicators used by the U.K. Audit Commission discussed below. Two example of 
benchmarking analysis used by MPMP are presented in Figures 1 and 2.
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Figure 1: Comparative efficiency of general government (General Administration)
Source: Government of Ontario (2011)
Figure 2: Comparative efficiency of paved roads
Source: Government of Ontario (2011)
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Self-imposed transparency in local governance
This is an area where local governments in the United States excel. They do this by 
presenting the information in their annual budgets for each service category. Fairfax 
County, Virginia and Montgomery County, Maryland and Cities of Conrad and Cary, 
North Carolina represent outstanding examples of full disclosure of their operations 
through performance budgeting on their website (see Annex for examples). 
Figure 3: Results based bhain: all programs should give the citizens a clear window 
on the results chain
Source: Shah (2005)
Figure 4: Performance budgeting payoffs: budget as useful source of performance 
information
• Cost: Inputs/resources used to produce outputs
• Output: Quantity and quality of goods and services produced
• Outcome: Progress in achieving program objectives
• Impact: Program goals
• Reach: People who benefit or are hurt by a program
• Quality: Measure of service such as timeliness, accessibility, courtesy, accuracy
• Productivity: Output by work hour
• Efficiency: Cost per unit of output
• Satisfaction: Rating of services by users
Source: Shah (2005)
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Table 6: Alternate budget formats
Feature Line Item Program Performance
Contents Exp. by objects 
(wages, travel, utilities, 
vehicles/equipment) or 
organization




Format Operating and capital 
expenditures
Exp. by program Inputs, outputs, outcomes, 
impact, reach
Orientation Input controls Input controls Focus on results
Management 
Paradigm
Top-down, rules driven Top-down, but within a 
program
Managerial flexibility but 
accountability for results
Source: Shen and Shah (2007)
A performance budget presents details on the entire results based chain (see Figure 
3) and in the process provides information that is relevant for policy makers as well 
as citizens based local government accountability (see Figure 4). Further such an 
approach to budgeting reinforces results based accountability of local governments 
(see Table 6 and Shen and Shah, 2007). 
5. Case studies in failure
Two examples of poorly designed and heavy handed central government oversight 
of local governments are reviewed in the following paragraphs to draw lessons of 
interest to other countries. 
5.1. The curious case of higher level local government intrusive oversight:  
UK audit commission
UK represents the most ambitious yet a curious case of higher level oversight of 
local governments. Through the Local Government Act, 1999, it introduced the 
Best Value Framework (BVF) as a statutory requirement for all local governments 
to deliver services to specified standards in the most efficient and effective manner 
possible. The BVF required every local government to report pre-specified set of 
cost and quality Best Value Performance Indicators (BVPI) for each service and 
also expectations and needs of their clients for various services. The UK Audit 
Commission served as the custodian of this program to ensure the integrity of data. 
The Commission subjected local governments to rigorous inspections and audits. In 
2002, BVPIs were replaced by a Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA). 
The CPA represented one of the most ambitious system to provide oversight on 
local government. The new system augmented individual service indicators by 
developing aggregate indicators of overall efficiency and effectiveness of individual 
authorities. These aggregate indicators showed how each local government 
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performed for each service and overall and in comparisons with other local 
governments. The CPA system led to significant improvements in service delivery 
performance but the system proved controversial as local governments became 
wary of the Audit Commission’s intervention in their day to day management and 
also complained about the heavy burden of reporting and inspections and audits. 
In response, Comprehensive Area Assessment (CAA) was replaced comprehensive 
performance assessment (CPA) in April 2009. CAA seeks to assess how well 
communities are being served by their local public services, including councils, 
police, health, and fire and rescue services. It emphasizes the quality of life of 
residents, and how well these bodies, working together, are achieving improvement 
and progressing towards long-term goals. It will also highlight best practice and 
innovation, and identify any barriers to improvement. The intention is also for CAA 
to provide information to local people about their local services. This will increase 
their awareness of the services available to them, empowering them to make better 
decisions and get value for money. To do this, CAA includes two elements:
Area assessment
An area assessment is a combined inspectorate judgment, which assesses the extent 
to which councils and their partners are delivering improvements on the issues that 
matter to people within the local area. It considers whether the priorities set in the 
area reflect those of the people who live there. Area assessments also look at how 
effectively improvements are delivered now and in the future.. The starting point 
for the area assessment is the sustainable community strategy (SCS) and local area 
agreement (LAA). The SCS sets out the vision and aspirations for an area and the 
LAA sets out how it shall be measured. The area assessment is not scored or ‘star 
rated’. It is a narrative report providing an overview of key priorities for the area, 
overall success and challenges, and a summary of prospects for improvement.
Area assessments may award green or red ‘flags’:
 – Green flags highlight exceptional performance or outstanding improvement 
from which others can learn.
 – Red flags represent significant concerns about outcomes or future prospects 
where more or different actions are required.
Organizational assessment
This focuses on the individual public bodies within an area to make sure they are 
accountable for quality and impact. It involves two assessments:
 – managing performance;
 – use of resources, which consists of three themes: managing finances, governing 
the business, and managing resources.
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The organizational assessment is scored from 1 to 4, with a rating from ‘performs 
poorly’ to ‘performs excellently’.
The new system proved to be too costly and too controversial. According to 
independent analysis, the reporting requirements cost each local government 
about 1.8 million pounds and about 20 million pounds for the audit commission 
expenses for the system. Responding to local government complaints about too 
intrusive oversight and his departments’ view about the cost-effectiveness of the 
program, Communities and Local Government Secretary Eric Pickles on 13 August 
2010 announced plans to discontinue the CAA and disband the Audit Commission. 
He argued that replacing the audit commission by a strengthened system local 
democratic accountability will save the central government about 50 million pounds 
a year in addition to enormous cost savings for local governments. He announced 
plans to encouraged local governments to have full and complete reporting to 
their residents and strengthen citizens’ rights to have greater recourse against local 
government failures. In addition, the auditing standards will be strengthened. This 
is precisely the approach followed in USA and Canada for the past half a century. 
5.2. The tragic case of central government oversight of local governments  
in Indonesia 
Indonesia represents a tragic case of a costly local government performance 
monitoring system implemented with external technical assistance that have 
yielded little useful performance information while imposing a huge cost for 
the Indonesian government. The system comprises three distinct subsystems 
(a) Indicators required at inception (62 indicators): general indicators on each 
local government detailing boundaries, organization, functions and finances and 
assets; (b) Annual Performance indicators mandatory for all (79 indicators): 
demographic, process and service delivery, and general indicators e.g. “book 
titles catalogued as proportion of number of books held by the library”(?); and 
(c) Indicators to discover problem local governments (115 indicators): a mixture 
of macro, demographic, service area, investment, climate, arts and culture and 
human resource indicators. Two major issues identified with these indicators are 
(a ) lack of any useful information on fiscal health; (b) inadequate focus on service 
delivery and an overwhelming focus on macro indicators beyond the control of 
local governments ; (c) local governments are required to undertake sophisticated 
statistical analysis to report inequality and human development indicators; and 
(d) indicators to discover problem local governments are mostly not relevant for 
any judgment on fiscal sustainability or service delivery performance. In addition, 
while an enormous amount of data are collected, these are never tabulated and 
analyzed for benchmarking or absolute analysis and no feedback is provided 
either to local governments or citizens at large. Overall the system represents a 
colossal waste of public resources.
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6. Concluding remarks
Local government performance accountability requires four types of assessments: 
(a) their compliance with due process and law; (b) monitoring of fiscal health for 
sustainability; (c) monitoring of service delivery ; and (d) citizens’ satisfaction 
with local services. The paper reviewed examples of better practices and not so 
good practices. Several important lessons from this review follow: (1) no formal 
information system is necessary to monitor compliance with due process and laws. 
Such non-compliance could be discovered by stratified random sampling audits; 
(2) fiscal health is best monitored through requirement of periodic submission of 
commercially audited financial statements; (3) service delivery performance is 
best monitored by having local government performance budgeting; to the extent 
a higher level monitoring system is required, it must focus on a few relevant 
indicators and must allow open access to such information and must provide timely 
feedback through analytical reports; (4) citizens’ satisfaction is best measured by 
having recourse to independent source such as an Ombudsman’s office and an open 
website to register such complaints. 
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Odgovornost za odgovorno obnašanje dužnosti:  
FAIR upravljanje okvirom za odgovorno obnašanje dužnosti lokalnih vlasti
Anwar Shah1
Sažetak
Ovaj članak usredotočuje se na ulogu lokalnih vlasti u postizanju fer, odgovornog, 
nekorumpiranog i responzivnog (FAIR) upravljanja. Lokalne vlasti diljem svijeta 
provele su važne inovacije kako bi pridobile povjerenje svojih stanovnika a njihova 
uspješnost/ rezultati rada su od posebnog interesa, pa ipak sveobuhvatan okvir za 
takvo poravnanje uspješnosti još uvijek nije dostupan. U radu se pokušava ispuniti 
ta praznina razvijanjem općeg okvira za preuzimanje odgovornosti lokalnih vlasti za 
uspješnost svoga rada i odnosa prakse iz stvarnog svijeta prema aspektima tog 
okvira. U nastavku predloženi okvir ocjenjivanja zahtijeva nekoliko vrsta procjene: 
(a) njihova usklađenost s propisanim postupkom i zakonom; (b) praćenje fiskalnog 
zdravlja za održivi razvoj; (c) praćenje pružanja usluga;i (d) zadovoljstvo građana s 
lokalnim službama. Ovaj pristup donosi ključne pokazatelje korisne za kriterije 
uspješnosti koji se mogu koristiti u samo-procijeni i za poboljšanje izvedbe. Iz 
analize prakse praćenja i procjene uspješnosti lokalnih vlasti, u radu se zaključuje 
da su ad hoc samostalni sustavi praćenja i evaluacije skuplji i manje korisni od 
ugrađenih alata i mehanizama za transparentnost vlade, samo-vrednovanja i 
građanske odgovornosti, kao što su izdaci lokalnih vlasti iz proračuna i izdaci 
temeljeni na fiskalnim doznakama za financiranje lokalnih službi. 
Ključne riječi: lokalna vlast, odgovornost, odgovorno obnašanje dužnosti, teorija, 
praksa, uspješnost
JEL klasifikacija: H11, H72, H75, H76, H79
1 Doktor znanosti, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics (SWUFE) Chengdu, 
China; Brookings Institution Washington, DC; World Bank. Znanstveni interes: lokalni 
ekonomski razvoj, financije lokalne samouprave, međuvladini fiskalni odnosi, decentralizacija. 
E-mail: shah.anwar@gmail.com.
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Appendices
Table A1: Annual list of measures in the municipal performance measurement 
program (MPMP)







Efficiency Operating costs for governance 
and corporate management as 
a percentage of total municipal 
operating costs
Fire
Fire services Efficient fire 
services
Efficiency Operating costs for fire services per 
$1,000 of assessment
Police
Police services Efficient police 
services
Efficiency Operating costs for police services 
per household
Violent crime rate Safe communities Effectiveness Violent crime rate per 1,000 
persons
Property crime rate Safe communities Effectiveness Property crime rate per 1,000 
persons
Total crime rate Safe communities Effectiveness Total crime rate per 1,000 persons 
(Criminal Code offences, excluding 
traffic)
Youth crime rate Safe communities Effectiveness Youths crime rate per 1,000 youths
Roadways
Paved roads Efficient 
maintenance of 
paved roads
Efficiency Operating costs for paved (hard 
top) roads per lane kilometre
Unpaved roads Efficient 
maintenance of 
unpaved roads
Efficiency Operating costs for unpaved (loose 






Efficiency Operating costs for winter 
maintenance of roadways per lane 
kilometre maintained in winter
Pavement condition Pavement condition 
meets municipal 
objectives
Effectiveness Percentage of paved lane 
kilometers where the condition is 
rated as good to very good
Response to winter 
storm events
Appropriate 
response to winter 
storm events
Effectiveness Percentage of winter events 
where the response met or 
exceeded locally determined road 
maintenance standards
Transit
Conventional transit Efficient 
conventional transit
Efficiency Operating costs for conventional 




Maximum Effectiveness Number of conventional transit 
passenger trips per personi n the 
service area in a year
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Service area Objective Type of Measure Measure






Efficiency Operating costs for the collection 









Efficiency Operating costs for the treatment 









Efficiency Operating costs for the collection, 
treatment and disposal of 








and human health 
hazards
Effectiveness Number of wastewater main 
backups per 100 kilometres of 







and human health 
hazards
Effectiveness Percentage of wastewater estimated 
to have by-passed treatment
Storm Water





Efficiency Operating costs for urban storm 
water management (collection, 
treatment, disposal) per kilometre 
of drainage system
Rural storm water 
management
Efficient rural storm 
water management
Efficiency Operating costs for rural storm 
water management (collection, 
treatment, disposal) per kilometre 
of drainage system
Drinking Water
Water treatment Efficient municipal 
water treatment 
services
Efficiency Operating costs for the treatment of 
drinking water per megalitre
Water distribution Efficient municipal 
water distribution 
services
Efficiency Operating costs for the distribution 





Efficiency Operating costs for the treatment 
and distribution of drinking water 
per megalitre (Integrated System)
Boil water advisories Water is safe and 
meets local needs
Effectiveness Weighted number of days when 
a boil water advisory issued by 
the Medical Officer of Health, 
applicable to a municipal water 
supply, was in effect
Water main breaks Improve system 
reliability
Effectiveness Number of water main breaks per 
100 kilometres of water distribution 
pipe in a year
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Service area Objective Type of Measure Measure
Solid Waste Management (Garbage)
Garbage collection Efficient municipal 
garbage collection
Efficiency Operating costs for garbage 
collection per tonne or per 
household
Garbage disposal Efficient municipal 
garbage disposal 
services
Efficiency Operating costs for garbage 







Efficiency Operating costs for solid waste 





Efficient solid waste 
management
Efficiency Average operating costs for solid 
waste management (collection, 
disposal and diversion) per tonne or 
per household
Complaints – 




of garbage and 
recycled materials
Effectiveness Number of complaints received in 
a year concerning the collection of 
garbage and recycled materials per 
1,000 households
Total number 
of solid waste 
management 
sites owned by 
municipality
Effectiveness Total number of solid waste 
management sites owned by the 
municipality with a Ministry 







do not have an 
adverse impact on 
environment
Effectiveness Number of days per year a Ministry 
of Environment compliance order 
for remediation concerning an air 
or groundwater standard was in 
effect for a municipality owned 








waste from landfills 
and/or incinerators
Effectiveness Percentage of residential solid 
waste diverted for recycling
Diversion of 
residential solid 






waste from landfills 
and/or incinerators
Effectiveness Percentage of residential solid 
waste diverted for recycling (based 
on combined residential and ICI 
tonnage)
Parks and Recreation
Parks Efficient operation 
of parks
Efficiency Operating costs for parks per 
person
Recreation programs Efficient operation 
of recreation 
programs
Efficiency Operating costs for recreation 
programs per person
Recreation facilities Efficient operation 
of recreation 
facilities







of parks, recreation 
programs and 
recreation facilities
Efficiency Operating costs for parks, 
recreation programs and recreation 
facilities per person
Anwar Shah • Responsibility with accountability: a FAIR governance framework... 
Zb. rad. Ekon. fak. Rij. • 2014 • vol. 32 • sv. 2 • 343-377 375
Service area Objective Type of Measure Measure
Trails Trails provide 
recreation 
opportunities
Effectiveness Total kilometres of trails per 1,000 
persons
Open space Open space is 
adequate population
Effectiveness Hectares of open space per 1,000 
persons (municipally owned)
Participant hours for 
recreation programs
Recreation programs 
serve needs of 
residents
Effectiveness Total participant hours for 






is adequate for 
population
Effectiveness Square metres of indoor recreation 






is adequate for 
population
Effectiveness Square metres of outdoor recreation 
facility space per 1,000 persons 
(municipally owned)
Library Services
Library services Efficient library 
services
Efficiency Operating costs for library services 
per person
Library services Efficient library 
services
Efficiency Operating costs for library services 
per use
Library services Increased use of 
library services
Effectiveness Library uses per person
Type of uses Better information 
on library usage
Effectiveness Electronic library uses as a 
percentage of total library uses
Type of uses Better information 
on library usage
Effectiveness Non-electronic library uses as a 
percentage of total library uses
Land-Use Planning
Location of new 
development
New lot creation 
is occurring in 
settlement areas
Effectiveness Percentage of new lots, blocks and/
or units with final approval which 
are located within settlement areas
Preservation of 
agricultural land 




Effectiveness Percentage of land designated for 
agricultural purposes which was 
not re-designated for other uses 






Effectiveness Percentage of land designated for 
agricultural purposes which was 
not re-designated for other uses 
relative to the base year of 2000
Change in number of 
agricultural hectares 




Effectiveness Number of hectares of land 
originally designated for 
agricultural purposes which was 
re-designated for other uses during 
the reporting year





Effectiveness Number of hectares of land 
originally designated for 
agricultural purposes which was 
re-designated for other uses since 
January 1, 2000
Source: Government of Ontario (2011)
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Table A2: An extract from Fairfax County, State of Virginia, USA Annual Budget 
(2006)
Fairfax County, Virginia – Police Patrol Services (1)
Funding Summary

















1321/ 1230.88 1189/ 1098.88 1188/ 1097.88 1200/ 1109.88 1200/ 1109.88
Total 
Expenditures $93,518,475 $84,535,731 $86,954,912 $94,807,577 $94,827,577
Position Summary

































1200 Positions (12) / 1109.88 Staff Years (12.0) ( ) Denotes New Positions
985 Sworn / 215 Civilians PT Denoted Part-Time Positions
2/2.0 SYE Grant Positions in Fund 102, Federal/State grant fund
Goal
To protect persons and property by providing essential law enforcement and public safety services, 
while promoting involvement, stability, and order through service assistance and visibility.
Objectives
To maintain the rate of Aggravated Assault cases per 10,000 population at 4.0 or less.
To maintain the rate of Burglary cases per 10,000 population at 17.8 or less.
To ensure that the rate of traffic crashes where alcohol was a factor per one million vehicle miles of 
travel in the County is no greater than 32.9.
Source: Government of Fairfax County, Virginia, USA (2006). Annual Budget. Fairfax: Fairfax 
 County
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Table A3: An extract from Fairfax County, State of Virginia, USA Annual Budget 
(2006)
Indicator















357 399 378 / 392 386 386
Burglary cases 
investigated 1,813 1,713 1,675 / 1,609 1,682 1,682
DWI arrests 2,536 2,815 2,665 / 2,899 2,698 2,698
Alcohol-related 










Priority 1 (in 
minutes)
5.9 6.1 6.3 / 6.9 5.0 5.0
Burglary case 












18.9 17.5 17.8 / 17.6 17.8 17.8
Alcohol-related 
crashes per one 
million vehicle 
miles of travel
37.4 34.9 33.7 / 27.7 32.9 32.9
Source: Government of Fairfax County, Virginia, USA (2006). Annual Budget. Fairfax: Fairfax 
 County
